Response to Manekin: Reading Aristotle through Gersonides: Innatism, Scepticism, and Empiricism
Ancient Philosophy Today · 2026-04 · 8 (1) · 33-45
DOI: 10.3366/anph.2026.0136 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Ancient Philosophy Today, 2026-04. Verfasst von David Bronstein. Die Arbeit nennt 2 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper engages with Charles Manekin’s interpretation of Gersonides’ account of our acquisition of first principles. I argue that reflecting on Gersonides’ approach to innatism, scepticism, and empiricism affords us insight into Aristotle’s thought. I discuss a long passage from Gersonides quoted and discussed in Manekin’s paper. I argue that Gersonides argues against two views contrary to Aristotle’s and Averroes’ position: innatism and scepticism. I then turn to Manekin’s account of Gersonides’ empiricism, arguing that we should distinguish between two theses concerning sense-perception’s contribution to our acquisition of first principles: one concerning causation and another concerning justification.
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APA
Bronstein, D. (2026). Response to Manekin: Reading Aristotle through Gersonides: Innatism, Scepticism, and Empiricism. Ancient Philosophy Today, 8(1), 33-45. https://doi.org/10.3366/anph.2026.0136
Vancouver
Bronstein D. Response to Manekin: Reading Aristotle through Gersonides: Innatism, Scepticism, and Empiricism. Ancient Philosophy Today. 2026;8(1):33-45. doi:10.3366/anph.2026.0136
BibTeX
@article{Bronstein2026,
author = {Bronstein, David},
title = {Response to Manekin: Reading Aristotle through Gersonides: Innatism, Scepticism, and Empiricism},
journal = {Ancient Philosophy Today},
year = {2026},
volume = {8},
number = {1},
pages = {33--45},
doi = {10.3366/anph.2026.0136}
}
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