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When Protagoras Made Aristotle His Fitch

Ian McCready-Flora

Ancient Philosophy Today · 2019

DOI: 10.3366/anph.2019.0014 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Ancient Philosophy Today, 2019. Verfasst von Ian McCready-Flora. Die Arbeit nennt 21 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

While defending the principle of non-contradiction in Metaphysics 4, Aristotle argues that the Measure Doctrine of Protagoras is equivalent to the claim that all contradictions are true; given all appearances are true (as the Protagorean maintains), anytime people disagree we get a true contradiction. This argument seems clearly invalid: nothing guarantees that actual disagreement occurs over every matter of fact. The argument in fact works perfectly, I propose, because the Protagorean view falls prey to a version of Fitch's “paradox” of knowability. The proposed reading shows how Aristotle treats the Protagorean view at issue as an epistemic theory of truth distinct from the mere claim that all appearances are true (which other opponents put forward on different grounds) and reveals Aristotle's underlying concern with the modal collapse of possibility into actuality. The revised Protagorean view Aristotle confronts in a subsequent chapter is furthermore best understood as an attempt to avoid this Fitch-style result.

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APA

McCready-Flora, I. (2019). When Protagoras Made Aristotle His Fitch. Ancient Philosophy Today. https://doi.org/10.3366/anph.2019.0014

Vancouver

McCready-Flora I. When Protagoras Made Aristotle His Fitch. Ancient Philosophy Today. 2019. doi:10.3366/anph.2019.0014

BibTeX
@article{McCreadyFlora2019,
  author = {McCready-Flora, Ian},
  title = {When Protagoras Made Aristotle His Fitch},
  journal = {Ancient Philosophy Today},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.3366/anph.2019.0014}
}
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