Emotions: Theories and Moral Value
Journal of Philosophy of Emotion · 2021
DOI: 10.33497/2021.summer.2 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Philosophy of Emotion, 2021. Verfasst von Aaron Ben-Ze’ev. Die Arbeit nennt 14 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This excellent book offers a clearly articulated and convincing perspective on basic disputes in the philosophy of emotions. Although it deals with complex issues, it presents them in an engaging manner. This commentary focuses on two major issues: emotional components and theories; and the role of emotions in morality. I will not discuss the many issues concerning Brady’s view which I fully embrace, but rather focus on two major issues: emotional components and theories; and the role of emotions in morality. I argue that Brady’s classification of emotional components and emotional theories are problematic. I also basically agree with Brady’s view on the role of emotions in morality; but, following Spinoza, I further develop this view.
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APA
Ben-Ze’ev, A. (2021). Emotions: Theories and Moral Value. Journal of Philosophy of Emotion. https://doi.org/10.33497/2021.summer.2
Vancouver
Ben-Ze’ev A. Emotions: Theories and Moral Value. Journal of Philosophy of Emotion. 2021. doi:10.33497/2021.summer.2
BibTeX
@article{BenZeev2021,
author = {Ben-Ze’ev, Aaron},
title = {Emotions: Theories and Moral Value},
journal = {Journal of Philosophy of Emotion},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.33497/2021.summer.2}
}
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