Intergovernmental Relations, Market-Preserving Federalism, and Digital Governance in Nigeria
Bullion · 31.03.2026 · 50 (1) · 36-52
DOI: 10.33429/0331-7919.1635 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Bullion, online erschienen am 31.03.2026. Verfasst von Dhikru Adewale YAGBOYAJU und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper analyses intergovernmental fiscal relations in Nigeria using Barry Weingast’s theory of market-preserving federalism. It argues that excessive fiscal centralisation, weak subnational autonomy, and recurring disputes over revenue allocation, such as those involving value-added tax and oil derivation, undermine inclusive economic development. Using qualitative analysis of policy documents, legal frameworks, and audit reports, the study finds that embedding digital governance within a market-preserving federal framework could enhance subnational revenue generation, fiscal transparency, and competitive horizontal federalism.
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APA
YAGBOYAJU, D. A., & OMOTAYO, J. O. (2026). Intergovernmental Relations, Market-Preserving Federalism, and Digital Governance in Nigeria. Bullion, 50(1), 36-52. https://doi.org/10.33429/0331-7919.1635
Vancouver
YAGBOYAJU DA, OMOTAYO JO. Intergovernmental Relations, Market-Preserving Federalism, and Digital Governance in Nigeria. Bullion. 2026;50(1):36-52. doi:10.33429/0331-7919.1635
BibTeX
@article{YAGBOYAJU2026,
author = {YAGBOYAJU, Dhikru Adewale and OMOTAYO, Jeremiah Oluwadara},
title = {Intergovernmental Relations, Market-Preserving Federalism, and Digital Governance in Nigeria},
journal = {Bullion},
year = {2026},
volume = {50},
number = {1},
pages = {36--52},
doi = {10.33429/0331-7919.1635}
}
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