CFO-Origin CEOs and Corporate Tax Avoidance
Journal of Accounting and Finance · 25.07.2026 · 26 (2)
DOI: 10.33423/xwndct88 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Accounting and Finance, online erschienen am 25.07.2026. Verfasst von Ruonan Liu.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper asks whether chief executive officers who were previously chief financial officers run firms that pay lower cash taxes. I identify 12,467 first-time CEO appointments in S&P 1500 firms from 1992 to 2025, 940 of them filled by former CFOs. Firms led by CFO-origin CEOs report cash effective tax rates about 1.9 percentage points lower, with no difference in GAAP rates and no rise in tax-rate volatility. The reduction concentrates in domestic and non-research-intensive firms. Most of the gap reflects selection into already-low-tax firms, though event-study dynamics reveal an incremental decline where managerial discretion over tax planning is greatest.
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APA
Liu, R. (2026). CFO-Origin CEOs and Corporate Tax Avoidance. Journal of Accounting and Finance, 26(2). https://doi.org/10.33423/xwndct88
Vancouver
Liu R. CFO-Origin CEOs and Corporate Tax Avoidance. Journal of Accounting and Finance. 2026;26(2). doi:10.33423/xwndct88
BibTeX
@article{Liu2026,
author = {Liu, Ruonan},
title = {CFO-Origin CEOs and Corporate Tax Avoidance},
journal = {Journal of Accounting and Finance},
year = {2026},
volume = {26},
number = {2},
doi = {10.33423/xwndct88}
}
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