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Pay Dispersion, Unit Cohesion, and Team Performance: Evidence From the NFL’s 2011 CBA

Patrick L. O’Halloran, David J. Bashaw

Journal of Applied Business and Economics · 2026

DOI: 10.33423/0t5krx57 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Applied Business and Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Patrick L. O’Halloran und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We examine whether the NFL's 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) changed the relationship between salary dispersion and team performance. The CBA restricted rookie compensation, particularly for first-round draft picks, potentially altering the source of pay inequality under a hard salary cap. Using team-season data from 2000-2022, we compare offensive and defensive pay dispersion using Gini coefficients and top-four salary concentration measures. Results indicate defensive pay dispersion is negatively associated with winning after the CBA. Although offensive upper-tail compensation shifts away from rookie-contract players and toward veterans, we find no corresponding positive effect on performance.

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APA

O’Halloran, P. L., & Bashaw, D. J. (2026). Pay Dispersion, Unit Cohesion, and Team Performance: Evidence From the NFL’s 2011 CBA. Journal of Applied Business and Economics. https://doi.org/10.33423/0t5krx57

Vancouver

O’Halloran PL, Bashaw DJ. Pay Dispersion, Unit Cohesion, and Team Performance: Evidence From the NFL’s 2011 CBA. Journal of Applied Business and Economics. 2026. doi:10.33423/0t5krx57

BibTeX
@article{OHalloran2026,
  author = {O’Halloran, Patrick L. and Bashaw, David J.},
  title = {Pay Dispersion, Unit Cohesion, and Team Performance: Evidence From the NFL’s 2011 CBA},
  journal = {Journal of Applied Business and Economics},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.33423/0t5krx57}
}
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