Pay Dispersion, Unit Cohesion, and Team Performance: Evidence From the NFL’s 2011 CBA
Journal of Applied Business and Economics · 2026
DOI: 10.33423/0t5krx57 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Applied Business and Economics, 2026. Verfasst von Patrick L. O’Halloran und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We examine whether the NFL's 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) changed the relationship between salary dispersion and team performance. The CBA restricted rookie compensation, particularly for first-round draft picks, potentially altering the source of pay inequality under a hard salary cap. Using team-season data from 2000-2022, we compare offensive and defensive pay dispersion using Gini coefficients and top-four salary concentration measures. Results indicate defensive pay dispersion is negatively associated with winning after the CBA. Although offensive upper-tail compensation shifts away from rookie-contract players and toward veterans, we find no corresponding positive effect on performance.
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APA
O’Halloran, P. L., & Bashaw, D. J. (2026). Pay Dispersion, Unit Cohesion, and Team Performance: Evidence From the NFL’s 2011 CBA. Journal of Applied Business and Economics. https://doi.org/10.33423/0t5krx57
Vancouver
O’Halloran PL, Bashaw DJ. Pay Dispersion, Unit Cohesion, and Team Performance: Evidence From the NFL’s 2011 CBA. Journal of Applied Business and Economics. 2026. doi:10.33423/0t5krx57
BibTeX
@article{OHalloran2026,
author = {O’Halloran, Patrick L. and Bashaw, David J.},
title = {Pay Dispersion, Unit Cohesion, and Team Performance: Evidence From the NFL’s 2011 CBA},
journal = {Journal of Applied Business and Economics},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.33423/0t5krx57}
}
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