Strategies of Mixed Coalitions in Group Lending and Equitable Distribution of Joint Profit
Journal of Investment, Banking and Finance · 2024
DOI: 10.33140/jibf.02.01.17 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Investment, Banking and Finance, 2024. Verfasst von Adamou Ntieche. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The objective of this paper is to highlight the usefulness of cooperative game theory as a conceptual framework for approaching problems related to the formation of mixed coalitions within group lending and the fair distribution of joint profit. The focus was on a particular technique, the Shapley value, originally proposed as an a priori solution to a cooperative game. Furthermore, the central idea of this approach is indifference to the desires of others: individualism. We succeed in establishing the threshold level for determining the value obtained for a fair distribution of joint resources. The only element that could limit the applicability of this value to any sharing problem comes from the assumption that coalitions are formed in a random way, which is not always respected in reality
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APA
Ntieche, A. (2024). Strategies of Mixed Coalitions in Group Lending and Equitable Distribution of Joint Profit. Journal of Investment, Banking and Finance. https://doi.org/10.33140/jibf.02.01.17
Vancouver
Ntieche A. Strategies of Mixed Coalitions in Group Lending and Equitable Distribution of Joint Profit. Journal of Investment, Banking and Finance. 2024. doi:10.33140/jibf.02.01.17
BibTeX
@article{Ntieche2024,
author = {Ntieche, Adamou},
title = {Strategies of Mixed Coalitions in Group Lending and Equitable Distribution of Joint Profit},
journal = {Journal of Investment, Banking and Finance},
year = {2024},
doi = {10.33140/jibf.02.01.17}
}
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