Insider Trading Around ESOP Announcements: Wealth Effect vs. Control Effect
International Journal of Banking and Finance · 2003
DOI: 10.32890/ijbf2003.1.2.5 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Banking and Finance, 2003. Verfasst von Zahid Iqbal und 2 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Following the enactment of ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) in 1974, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) have become a popular form of employee compensation among U.S. companies. The introduction of an ESOP has important implications for management interest that should encourage insiders buying activity. This paper documents that unusual insider buying activity has indeed resulted from the introduction of an ESOP. Further we examine two competing explanations, the wealth hypothesis and the control hypothesis, for the increase in insiders buying activity. We conclude that insiders buying activity is primarily motivated by control considerations.
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APA
Iqbal, Z., Pettengill, G. N., & Shetty, S. (2003). Insider Trading Around ESOP Announcements: Wealth Effect vs. Control Effect. International Journal of Banking and Finance. https://doi.org/10.32890/ijbf2003.1.2.5
Vancouver
Iqbal Z, Pettengill GN, Shetty S. Insider Trading Around ESOP Announcements: Wealth Effect vs. Control Effect. International Journal of Banking and Finance. 2003. doi:10.32890/ijbf2003.1.2.5
BibTeX
@article{Iqbal2003,
author = {Iqbal, Zahid and Pettengill, Glenn N. and Shetty, Shekar},
title = {Insider Trading Around ESOP Announcements: Wealth Effect vs. Control Effect},
journal = {International Journal of Banking and Finance},
year = {2003},
doi = {10.32890/ijbf2003.1.2.5}
}
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