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Crossref

Naturalizzazione, mente e conoscenza

Giancarlo Zanet

RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA · 2009

DOI: 10.3280/sf2009-001009 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA, 2009. Verfasst von Giancarlo Zanet. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

- A controversial issue regarding Quine's naturalised epistemology is that it may involve some form of reductionism. This article focuses on one of these forms, analysing the interplay of his philosophy of mind and epistemology. It aims to show that if we take into proper consideration the way in which the version of anomalous monism embraced affects his conception of mental states like sensations and propositional attitudes, Quine's philosophy of mind should be regarded as anti-reductionist. Through a discussion of his theory of perception, I try to argue that what is entailed by it is, in a sense only partially accepted by Quine himself, that neither perception nor observational language can be strictly reduced to their stimulatory conditions. By pointing out the relevance that Quine attributes to the mechanism of empathy as a means for ascribing propositional attitudes, a further interesting argument is provided to underline that, within a naturalized epistemology, there is room for a non-reductive description of mind in some ways close to the results of the hermeneutic tradition.

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APA

Zanet, G. (2009). Naturalizzazione, mente e conoscenza. RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA. https://doi.org/10.3280/sf2009-001009

Vancouver

Zanet G. Naturalizzazione, mente e conoscenza. RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA. 2009. doi:10.3280/sf2009-001009

BibTeX
@article{Zanet2009,
  author = {Zanet, Giancarlo},
  title = {Naturalizzazione, mente e conoscenza},
  journal = {RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA},
  year = {2009},
  doi = {10.3280/sf2009-001009}
}
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