Notion of Private Language in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophcus and some Contemporary Linguistic Refutations
Disputatio philosophica · 2021
DOI: 10.32701/dp.22.1.4 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Disputatio philosophica, 2021. Verfasst von Marko Kardum und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, the possibility of private language argument in Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus is analyzed. The concept of ‘language that only I could understand” is connected to solipsism, or the impossibility to understand other people’s way of seeing the world. But all members of the same community are able to communicate using the same language, so this language is a general language, and there is no private language, just a private perception of the world. Contemporary linguistic theories of Chomsky and de Saussure are close to this interpretation of private language.
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APA
Kardum, M., & Skelac, I. (2021). Notion of Private Language in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophcus and some Contemporary Linguistic Refutations. Disputatio philosophica. https://doi.org/10.32701/dp.22.1.4
Vancouver
Kardum M, Skelac I. Notion of Private Language in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophcus and some Contemporary Linguistic Refutations. Disputatio philosophica. 2021. doi:10.32701/dp.22.1.4
BibTeX
@article{Kardum2021,
author = {Kardum, Marko and Skelac, Ines},
title = {Notion of Private Language in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophcus and some Contemporary Linguistic Refutations},
journal = {Disputatio philosophica},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.32701/dp.22.1.4}
}
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