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Crossref

Unveiling Authentication Forgery in OpenID Connect under Web Frameworks: A Formal Analysis of CSRF-Based Attack Paths

Xingyun Hu, Siqi Lu, Liujia Cai, Ye Feng, Shuhao Gu, Tao Hu, Yongjuan Wang

Computers, Materials & Continua · 2026 · 1-10

DOI: 10.32604/cmc.2026.079484 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Computers, Materials & Continua, 2026. Verfasst von Xingyun Hu und 6 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

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APA

Hu, X., Lu, S., Cai, L., Feng, Y., Gu, S., Hu, T., & Wang, Y. (2026). Unveiling Authentication Forgery in OpenID Connect under Web Frameworks: A Formal Analysis of CSRF-Based Attack Paths. Computers, Materials & Continua, 0(0), 1-10. https://doi.org/10.32604/cmc.2026.079484

Vancouver

Hu X, Lu S, Cai L, Feng Y, Gu S, Hu T, et al. Unveiling Authentication Forgery in OpenID Connect under Web Frameworks: A Formal Analysis of CSRF-Based Attack Paths. Computers, Materials & Continua. 2026;0(0):1-10. doi:10.32604/cmc.2026.079484

BibTeX
@article{Hu2026,
  author = {Hu, Xingyun and Lu, Siqi and Cai, Liujia and Feng, Ye and Gu, Shuhao and Hu, Tao and Wang, Yongjuan},
  title = {Unveiling Authentication Forgery in OpenID Connect under Web Frameworks: A Formal Analysis of CSRF-Based Attack Paths},
  journal = {Computers, Materials & Continua},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {0},
  number = {0},
  pages = {1--10},
  doi = {10.32604/cmc.2026.079484}
}
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