EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Studienprotokoll

Abstractions for security protocol verification

Binh Thanh Nguyen, Christoph Sprenger, Cas Cremers

Journal of Computer Security · 10.07.2018 · 26 (4) · 459-508

DOI: 10.3233/jcs-15769 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Studienprotokoll in der Zeitschrift Journal of Computer Security, online erschienen am 06.06.2018. Verfasst von Binh Thanh Nguyen und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 47 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We present a large class of security protocol abstractions with the aim of improving the scope and efficiency of verification tools. We propose abstractions that transform a term’s structure based on its type as well as abstractions that remove atomic messages, variables, and redundant terms. Our theory improves on previous work by supporting rewrite theories with the finite-variant property, user-defined types, and untyped variables to cover type flaw attacks. We prove soundness results for an expressive property language that includes secrecy and authentication. Applying our abstractions to realistic IETF protocol models, we achieve dramatic speedups and extend the scope of several modern security protocol analyzers.

Zitieren

APA

Nguyen, B. T., Sprenger, C., & Cremers, C. (2018). Abstractions for security protocol verification. Journal of Computer Security, 26(4), 459-508. https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-15769

Vancouver

Nguyen BT, Sprenger C, Cremers C. Abstractions for security protocol verification. Journal of Computer Security. 2018;26(4):459-508. doi:10.3233/jcs-15769

BibTeX
@article{Nguyen2018,
  author = {Nguyen, Binh Thanh and Sprenger, Christoph and Cremers, Cas},
  title = {Abstractions for security protocol verification},
  journal = {Journal of Computer Security},
  year = {2018},
  volume = {26},
  number = {4},
  pages = {459--508},
  doi = {10.3233/jcs-15769}
}
Kostenlos starten →