Missing Phenomenological Accounts: Disability Theory, Body Integrity Identity Disorder, and Being an Amputee
International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics · 27.08.2018 · 11 (2) · 83-111
DOI: 10.3138/ijfab.2017.12.05 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, erschienen am 27.08.2018. Verfasst von Christine Wieseler. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 83 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Phenomenology provides a method for disability theorists to describe embodied subjectivity lacking within the social model of disability. Within the literature on body integrity identity disorder (BIID), dominant narratives of disability are influential, individual bodies are considered in isolation, and experiences of disabled people are omitted. Research on BIID tends to incorporate an individualist ontology. In this article, I argue that Merleau-Ponty's conceptualization of “being in the world,” which recognizes subjectivity as embodied and intersubjective, provides a better starting point for research describing the experiences of those with BIID and amputees.
Zitieren
APA
Wieseler, C. (2018). Missing Phenomenological Accounts: Disability Theory, Body Integrity Identity Disorder, and Being an Amputee. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, 11(2), 83-111. https://doi.org/10.3138/ijfab.2017.12.05
Vancouver
Wieseler C. Missing Phenomenological Accounts: Disability Theory, Body Integrity Identity Disorder, and Being an Amputee. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics. 2018;11(2):83-111. doi:10.3138/ijfab.2017.12.05
BibTeX
@article{Wieseler2018,
author = {Wieseler, Christine},
title = {Missing Phenomenological Accounts: Disability Theory, Body Integrity Identity Disorder, and Being an Amputee},
journal = {International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics},
year = {2018},
volume = {11},
number = {2},
pages = {83--111},
doi = {10.3138/ijfab.2017.12.05}
}
EUVIMED