On the Limits of the Principle of Sufficient Autonomy
Law, Ethics and Philosophy · 2018
DOI: 10.31009/leap.2017.v5.14 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Law, Ethics and Philosophy, 2018. Verfasst von CHRIS MILLS.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In his recent book, Just Enough, Liam Shields offers a novel defence of the Principle of Sufficient Autonomy. According to this principle, each citizen is owed ‘enough’ powers of deliberation and scope for decision - making as a matter of justice in order to satisfy our fundamental interest in acting and believing freely. In this article, I offer two objections against this view. The first objection challenges the plausibility of the principle. I argue that the principle that Shields derives from our interest in freedom will struggle to secure the proper protection for our capacities for autonomous behaviour that man y autonomy - minded liberals would expect the principle to provide. The second objection challenges the distinctiveness of the principle. I argue that Shields’ defence cannot successfully dismiss all of its competitors and I offer an account of constitutive welfarism to illustrate this point.
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APA
MILLS, C. (2018). On the Limits of the Principle of Sufficient Autonomy. Law, Ethics and Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.31009/leap.2017.v5.14
Vancouver
MILLS C. On the Limits of the Principle of Sufficient Autonomy. Law, Ethics and Philosophy. 2018. doi:10.31009/leap.2017.v5.14
BibTeX
@article{MILLS2018,
author = {MILLS, CHRIS},
title = {On the Limits of the Principle of Sufficient Autonomy},
journal = {Law, Ethics and Philosophy},
year = {2018},
doi = {10.31009/leap.2017.v5.14}
}
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