An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Perspective on the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Alınteri Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi · 2026
DOI: 10.30913/alinterisosbil.1949249 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Alınteri Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 2026. Verfasst von Aras Yolusever. Die Arbeit nennt 21 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is the canonical model in microeconomics for the tension between individual rationality and collective welfare. Standard game-theoretic analysis predicts that mutual defection is the unique Nash equilibrium, despite being Pareto-dominated by mutual cooperation. This study revisits the Prisoner’s Dilemma through the lens of evolutionary game theory, in which strategy frequencies in a population evolve according to differential payoffs. We derive the replicator equation for the one-shot game and show analytically that the all-defectors state is the unique asymptotically stable equilibrium and the unique evolutionarily stable strategy. We then extend the analysis to the infinitely repeated game with continuation probability , contrasting the reactive strategy Tit-for-Tat (TFT) with Always Defect (ALLD). We derive the critical continuation probability above which TFT becomes an ESS within the restricted two-strategy space (that is, resists invasion by ALLD), the bistable replicator dynamics that emerge in that regime, and a closed-form expression for the unstable interior equilibrium that separates the two basins of attraction. The bifurcation structure is interpreted economically as a precise formalisation of Axelrod’s “shadow of the future.” All results are derived from first principles and illustrated with numerical examples.
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APA
Yolusever, A. (2026). An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Perspective on the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Alınteri Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi. https://doi.org/10.30913/alinterisosbil.1949249
Vancouver
Yolusever A. An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Perspective on the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Alınteri Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi. 2026. doi:10.30913/alinterisosbil.1949249
BibTeX
@article{Yolusever2026,
author = {Yolusever, Aras},
title = {An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Perspective on the Prisoner’s Dilemma},
journal = {Alınteri Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.30913/alinterisosbil.1949249}
}
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