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Fictions and Make-believe

Pamela Boongaling

Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía · 27.04.2026 · 45 (1)

DOI: 10.30827/trif.33576 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, online erschienen am 27.04.2026. Verfasst von Pamela Boongaling. Die Arbeit nennt 11 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In this paper, I will discuss how Mary Leng makes use of Kendall Walton’s theory of make-believe to develop her version of mathematical fictionalism. Doing so will already establish that since mathematical statements are only true within a game of pretence, her position already denies the existence of mathematical objects. Nevertheless, I will show that even though she employs Walton’s theory of pretence, her position remains vulnerable to Penelope Maddy’s critique—namely, that by presupposing a metaphysics of modal facts, her view amounts to a form of robust realism. I will demonstrate that Leng can overcome this problem if she clearly distinguishes between modal reasoning within a fictionalist framework and modal realism as an ontological stance. By doing so, Leng’s mathematical fictionalism can uphold its anti-realist stance thereby ensuring that it does not collapse into modal realism or robust realism.

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APA

Boongaling, P. (2026). Fictions and Make-believe. Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 45(1). https://doi.org/10.30827/trif.33576

Vancouver

Boongaling P. Fictions and Make-believe. Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía. 2026;45(1). doi:10.30827/trif.33576

BibTeX
@article{Boongaling2026,
  author = {Boongaling, Pamela},
  title = {Fictions and Make-believe},
  journal = {Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {45},
  number = {1},
  doi = {10.30827/trif.33576}
}
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