Fictions and Make-believe
Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía · 27.04.2026 · 45 (1)
DOI: 10.30827/trif.33576 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, online erschienen am 27.04.2026. Verfasst von Pamela Boongaling. Die Arbeit nennt 11 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, I will discuss how Mary Leng makes use of Kendall Walton’s theory of make-believe to develop her version of mathematical fictionalism. Doing so will already establish that since mathematical statements are only true within a game of pretence, her position already denies the existence of mathematical objects. Nevertheless, I will show that even though she employs Walton’s theory of pretence, her position remains vulnerable to Penelope Maddy’s critique—namely, that by presupposing a metaphysics of modal facts, her view amounts to a form of robust realism. I will demonstrate that Leng can overcome this problem if she clearly distinguishes between modal reasoning within a fictionalist framework and modal realism as an ontological stance. By doing so, Leng’s mathematical fictionalism can uphold its anti-realist stance thereby ensuring that it does not collapse into modal realism or robust realism.
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APA
Boongaling, P. (2026). Fictions and Make-believe. Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 45(1). https://doi.org/10.30827/trif.33576
Vancouver
Boongaling P. Fictions and Make-believe. Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía. 2026;45(1). doi:10.30827/trif.33576
BibTeX
@article{Boongaling2026,
author = {Boongaling, Pamela},
title = {Fictions and Make-believe},
journal = {Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía},
year = {2026},
volume = {45},
number = {1},
doi = {10.30827/trif.33576}
}
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