Is There a Possible World in which Imagining Zombies Can Shed Light on Our Understanding of Consciousness?
Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía · 2024
DOI: 10.30827/trif.32734 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 2024. Verfasst von Asier Arias Domínguez. Die Arbeit nennt 63 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this article I criticize the explanatory reductionism underlying the zombie argument from the point of view of the philosophy of science. I argue that it is a thesis that finds no support in the available models of reduction, a thesis that is based on an unfounded idealization of the natural sciences and that depends on an uncertain appeal to the possibility in principle of a future unified physics. I conclude that the uncertain character of these assumptions calls for a reassessment, not only of the implications of this type of argument for methodological naturalism but also of the role such arguments play in the study of consciousness.
Zitieren
APA
Domínguez, A. A. (2024). Is There a Possible World in which Imagining Zombies Can Shed Light on Our Understanding of Consciousness?. Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía. https://doi.org/10.30827/trif.32734
Vancouver
Domínguez AA. Is There a Possible World in which Imagining Zombies Can Shed Light on Our Understanding of Consciousness?. Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía. 2024. doi:10.30827/trif.32734
BibTeX
@article{Domnguez2024,
author = {Domínguez, Asier Arias},
title = {Is There a Possible World in which Imagining Zombies Can Shed Light on Our Understanding of Consciousness?},
journal = {Teorema. Revista Internacional de Filosofía},
year = {2024},
doi = {10.30827/trif.32734}
}
EUVIMED