İbn Kemalpaşa’s Criticisms of Hocazâde Concerning Mūjib bi’l-dhāt
Harran Theology Journal · 15.06.2026 · (55) · 444-463
DOI: 10.30623/hij.1853378 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Harran Theology Journal, online erschienen am 15.06.2026. Verfasst von Hafzullah Genç. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The debate over whether an agent’s influence on their acts occurs through choice or necessity is one of the deepest rifts opened by the disputes between kalām and philosophy. In his Tahāfut, al-Ghazālī reveals the magnitude of this issue by asserting the necessity of declaring the philosophers as disbelievers due to their views on the matter. al-Ghazālī’s stance on takfīr partially persisted within the tradition of Tahāfut writing that followed him. ‘Alī al-Ṭūsī, the author of Tahāfut al-Falāsifa (also known as Kitāb al-Zuhr), affirmed al-Ghazālī by stating that the doctrine of mūjib bi’dh-dhāt is a subject that warrants the charge of disbelief against the philosophers. However, this attitude was abandoned by other Tahāfut authors such as Khojazāda, Ibn Kemālpāshā, Qarabāghī, and Üsküdārī.The answers given to the question of how an agent -possessing knowledge, power, and will- influences their act have been conceptualized in the intellectual tradition as free agent or the powerful free agent (al-fā‘il al-mukhtâr) on one hand, and the necessitating cause by essence on the other. Did the universe, as a contingent being, emerge through God’s free choice or through necessity proceeding from God? Khojazāda opened a separate title in his Tahāfut, proceeding from the premise that this subject is the thought underlying the eternity of the world. Under the title “On the Invalidation of the Philosophers’ View that the First Principle is Not a Free Agent but a Necessitating Cause by Essence” he explained that the Necessary Being’s acting through necessity would entail the eternity of the world. Yet, in this section, he primarily responded to the philosophers’ objections against the theologians regarding why the Necessary Being should not act through elective choice. This is because Khojazāda claims that the dispute between the theologians and the philosophers stems from their differing conceptions of Allah’s attribute of power. Defining the “powerful” as “the one who acts if He wills and does not act if He does not will,” Khojazāda points out to the philosophers that God has no option of “not willing,” and consequently, no option of “not acting” in their system.Ibn Kemālpāshā, one of the Ottoman Sheikh al-Islams, authored a gloss on Khojazāda ’s Tahāfut. This gloss addresses the first fifteen problems of Khojazāda’s Tahāfut -which originally consists of twenty-two chapters- while omitting the remaining seven topics. From the very first problem, Ibn Kemalpaşa directs rigorous critiques toward Khojazāda. This study aims to determine whether Ibn Kemalpaşa’s criticisms -stemming from his claim that Khojazāda misunderstood the philosophers’ concept of the mūjib bi’dh-dhāt- reflect the truth. According to Ibn Kemālpāshā, Khojazāda presumed that the philosophers’ attribution of ‘necessitation’ to God was identical to the mechanical necessity found in inanimate beings. Contrary to this view, we contend that Khojazāda understood the philosophers’ position accurately and formulated his critiques accordingly. This study seeks to demonstrate and substantiate this perspective.
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APA
Genç, H. (2026). İbn Kemalpaşa’s Criticisms of Hocazâde Concerning Mūjib bi’l-dhāt. Harran Theology Journal, 444-463. https://doi.org/10.30623/hij.1853378
Vancouver
Genç H. İbn Kemalpaşa’s Criticisms of Hocazâde Concerning Mūjib bi’l-dhāt. Harran Theology Journal. 2026:444-463. doi:10.30623/hij.1853378
BibTeX
@article{Gen2026,
author = {Genç, Hafzullah},
title = {İbn Kemalpaşa’s Criticisms of Hocazâde Concerning Mūjib bi’l-dhāt},
journal = {Harran Theology Journal},
year = {2026},
number = {55},
pages = {444--463},
doi = {10.30623/hij.1853378}
}
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