An Integrated Multi-Strategy Detection and Mitigation Framework Against Coremelt, Crossfire, and Cross-Path Link-Flooding Attacks in Software-Defined Networking
Journal of Advances in Science and Technology · 02.03.2026 · 23 (1) · 461-479
DOI: 10.29070/537y6q88 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Advances in Science and Technology, online erschienen am 02.03.2026. Verfasst von Archana Bhushan Burujwale und 2 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
SDN is a potential networking architecture that separates the control and data planes to allow centralised network administration, programmable traffic control, and dynamic resource allocation. Despite these benefits, its centralised design and reliance on programmable forwarding techniques expose network infrastructures to sophisticated DDoS assaults, notably link-flooding operations like Coremelt, Crossfire, and Cross-Path. These threats use carefully planned traffic flows, shared network resources, and important communication pathways to interrupt service availability while maintaining below traffic-detection thresholds, unlike volumetric assaults. For SDN settings, this paper presents an Integrated Multi-Strategy Detection and Mitigation Framework (MSDF) to recognise, analyse, and mitigate these three link-flooding threat types. Quantitative simulation/emulation was used to evaluate normal and malicious traffic situations across network topologies. The framework detected 97.8% of assaults, including 98.4% for Coremelt, 97.6% for Crossfire, and 97.3% for Cross-Path. The Cross-Path attack reduced network throughput to 57.8 Mbps and increased latency and packet loss to 39.6 ms and 15.4%. After mitigation, throughput reached 92.4 Mbps, latency dropped to 15.1 ms, and packet loss dropped to 2.4%. Critical-link usage dropped from 86.7% during the assault to 53.6% after mitigation. The evaluated topologies had an average service-restoration downtime of 11.3 seconds. An integrated, multi-layered security approach may increase threat detection, network performance, and service availability in SDN systems. The architecture addresses complex link-flooding threats by coordinated detection, adaptive traffic management, and network-wide mitigation.
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APA
Burujwale, A. B., Rahman, F., & Gurav, Y. (2026). An Integrated Multi-Strategy Detection and Mitigation Framework Against Coremelt, Crossfire, and Cross-Path Link-Flooding Attacks in Software-Defined Networking. Journal of Advances in Science and Technology, 23(1), 461-479. https://doi.org/10.29070/537y6q88
Vancouver
Burujwale AB, Rahman F, Gurav Y. An Integrated Multi-Strategy Detection and Mitigation Framework Against Coremelt, Crossfire, and Cross-Path Link-Flooding Attacks in Software-Defined Networking. Journal of Advances in Science and Technology. 2026;23(1):461-479. doi:10.29070/537y6q88
BibTeX
@article{Burujwale2026,
author = {Burujwale, Archana Bhushan and Rahman, F. and Gurav, Yogesh},
title = {An Integrated Multi-Strategy Detection and Mitigation Framework Against Coremelt, Crossfire, and Cross-Path Link-Flooding Attacks in Software-Defined Networking},
journal = {Journal of Advances in Science and Technology},
year = {2026},
volume = {23},
number = {1},
pages = {461--479},
doi = {10.29070/537y6q88}
}
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