Beyond Regulatory Reform: the missing role of incentives in New Zealand’s earthquake-prone building policy
Policy Quarterly · 25.05.2026 · 22 (2) · 40-48
DOI: 10.26686/pq.v22i2.10726 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Policy Quarterly, online erschienen am 25.05.2026. Verfasst von Olga Filippova und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This article examines recent reforms to New Zealand’s earthquake-prone building (EPB) system and argues that, while the reforms improve proportionality and risk targeting, they do not adequately address persistent financial barriers to seismic remediation. International evidence shows that regulatory regimes addressing public safety risks are more effective when complemented by financial and institutional incentives that reduce upfront costs, liquidity constraints and capability barriers. The article concludes that the absence of incentives within the reformed EPB framework raises questions about whether timely and consistent compliance can be achieved for the highest-risk buildings.
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APA
Filippova, O., & Perera, A. (2026). Beyond Regulatory Reform: the missing role of incentives in New Zealand’s earthquake-prone building policy. Policy Quarterly, 22(2), 40-48. https://doi.org/10.26686/pq.v22i2.10726
Vancouver
Filippova O, Perera A. Beyond Regulatory Reform: the missing role of incentives in New Zealand’s earthquake-prone building policy. Policy Quarterly. 2026;22(2):40-48. doi:10.26686/pq.v22i2.10726
BibTeX
@article{Filippova2026,
author = {Filippova, Olga and Perera, Amanda},
title = {Beyond Regulatory Reform: the missing role of incentives in New Zealand’s earthquake-prone building policy},
journal = {Policy Quarterly},
year = {2026},
volume = {22},
number = {2},
pages = {40--48},
doi = {10.26686/pq.v22i2.10726}
}
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