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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

Disagreeing with Opaqueness

Xinkan Zhao

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · 15.07.2026 · 31 (4) · 627-634

DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v31i4.6242 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, online erschienen am 15.07.2026. Verfasst von Xinkan Zhao. Die Arbeit nennt 11 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Recently, Stina Björkholm proposed a novel solution to the problem of lost disagreement on behalf of metaethical contextualists. The solution builds on the notion of an opaque question, which admits of both affirmative and negative answers that are semantically compatible. In this article, I challenge the notion by showing that Björkholm’s arguments fail to establish the existence of such questions. I also argue that opaqueness, in its more ordinary sense, can provide us with a promising way of solving the problem of disagreement. The opaqueness resides not in the nature of questions but in how speakers conceive of those questions.

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APA

Zhao, X. (2026). Disagreeing with Opaqueness. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 31(4), 627-634. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v31i4.6242

Vancouver

Zhao X. Disagreeing with Opaqueness. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 2026;31(4):627-634. doi:10.26556/jesp.v31i4.6242

BibTeX
@article{Zhao2026,
  author = {Zhao, Xinkan},
  title = {Disagreeing with Opaqueness},
  journal = {Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {31},
  number = {4},
  pages = {627--634},
  doi = {10.26556/jesp.v31i4.6242}
}
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