Disagreeing with Opaqueness
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · 15.07.2026 · 31 (4) · 627-634
DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v31i4.6242 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, online erschienen am 15.07.2026. Verfasst von Xinkan Zhao. Die Arbeit nennt 11 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Recently, Stina Björkholm proposed a novel solution to the problem of lost disagreement on behalf of metaethical contextualists. The solution builds on the notion of an opaque question, which admits of both affirmative and negative answers that are semantically compatible. In this article, I challenge the notion by showing that Björkholm’s arguments fail to establish the existence of such questions. I also argue that opaqueness, in its more ordinary sense, can provide us with a promising way of solving the problem of disagreement. The opaqueness resides not in the nature of questions but in how speakers conceive of those questions.
Zitieren
APA
Zhao, X. (2026). Disagreeing with Opaqueness. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 31(4), 627-634. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v31i4.6242
Vancouver
Zhao X. Disagreeing with Opaqueness. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 2026;31(4):627-634. doi:10.26556/jesp.v31i4.6242
BibTeX
@article{Zhao2026,
author = {Zhao, Xinkan},
title = {Disagreeing with Opaqueness},
journal = {Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy},
year = {2026},
volume = {31},
number = {4},
pages = {627--634},
doi = {10.26556/jesp.v31i4.6242}
}
EUVIMED