Valuing Diversity
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · 01.08.2024 · 28 (2) · 264-290
DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v28i2.3317 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, online erschienen am 01.08.2024. Verfasst von Michael A. Livermore. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 43 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Other things being equal, worlds with greater diversity of subjective experiences are better than worlds with less diversity of experiences. This is the claim of the heteric welfarist. Such a view adds the diversity of experiences to the traditional welfarist concerns of aggregate well-being and the distribution of well-being over persons. The heteric welfarist could endorse the conservation of endangered species and the protection of threatened cultures and ways of life, even at some cost to aggregate well-being or fairness. Heteric welfare could also provide reasons to favor advances in synthetic life or artificial intelligence, to oppose intervention in natural processes to prevent wild animal suffering, and to be more sanguine about Parfitt’s repugnant conclusion. This paper argues that heteric welfarism vindicates plausible intuitions in favor of more diverse worlds and explores some of the implications of this view.
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APA
Livermore, M. A. (2024). Valuing Diversity. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 28(2), 264-290. https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v28i2.3317
Vancouver
Livermore MA. Valuing Diversity. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 2024;28(2):264-290. doi:10.26556/jesp.v28i2.3317
BibTeX
@article{Livermore2024,
author = {Livermore, Michael A.},
title = {Valuing Diversity},
journal = {Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy},
year = {2024},
volume = {28},
number = {2},
pages = {264--290},
doi = {10.26556/jesp.v28i2.3317}
}
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