EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Representação de Interesses, Assimetria Informacional e Arquitetura Institucional

Bruna Nubiato

Journal of Law and Regulation · 04.06.2026 · 12 (1) · 588-606

DOI: 10.26512/2446-52592026e61547 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Law and Regulation, online erschienen am 04.06.2026. Verfasst von Bruna Nubiato. Die Arbeit nennt 39 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

[Purpose] This article examines the absence of a general regulatory framework for organized interest representation in Brazil, investigating whether this gap constitutes a mere legislative omission or an institutional design problem with implications for democratic legitimacy. [Methodology/approach/design] The study adopts a narrative theoretical review associated with documentary and normative analysis of Bill No. 1,202/2007 and of the Brazilian legal framework on administrative transparency. The theoretical review reconstructs analytical categories from Public Choice Theory, institutional economics, contractual constitutionalism, and contemporary democratic theory, with emphasis on transparency, accountability, responsiveness, and democratic legitimacy. This methodological combination allows the article to assess the Brazilian normative status quo and the institutional design proposed for lobbying regulation. [Findings] The research demonstrates that the absence of specific regulation does not eliminate political influence but rather preserves it within a context of partial regulatory opacity. It argues that lobbying regulation should be understood as an issue of institutional architecture aimed at informational equalization and democratic accountability rather than as a restriction on political participation. [Practical implications] The findings suggest that the transparent institutionalization of interest representation may contribute to strengthening democratic governance, improving accountability mechanisms, and enhancing the quality of public decision-making in Brazil. [Originality/value] The article advances the debate by reframing lobbying regulation as a structural institutional matter rather than a moral or prohibitive concern, integrating Public Choice Theory with Brazilian institutional analysis.

Zitieren

APA

Nubiato, B. (2026). Representação de Interesses, Assimetria Informacional e Arquitetura Institucional. Journal of Law and Regulation, 12(1), 588-606. https://doi.org/10.26512/2446-52592026e61547

Vancouver

Nubiato B. Representação de Interesses, Assimetria Informacional e Arquitetura Institucional. Journal of Law and Regulation. 2026;12(1):588-606. doi:10.26512/2446-52592026e61547

BibTeX
@article{Nubiato2026,
  author = {Nubiato, Bruna},
  title = {Representação de Interesses, Assimetria Informacional e Arquitetura Institucional},
  journal = {Journal of Law and Regulation},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {12},
  number = {1},
  pages = {588--606},
  doi = {10.26512/2446-52592026e61547}
}
Kostenlos starten →