Freedom of Will as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability: Humans and Artificial Intelligence in a Czech Criminal Law Perspective
Ius Novum · 01.03.2026 · 20 (1) · 1-24
DOI: 10.2478/in-2026-0001 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Ius Novum, online erschienen am 30.04.2026. Verfasst von Jaroslav Fenyk. Die Arbeit nennt 41 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-SA 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The paper analyses the form and place of human will in the foundations of criminal liability. It explains the necessity of will for the traditional criminal liability of natural persons and presents a comparison with the possible criminal liability of autonomous and non-autonomous systems equipped with artificial intelligence. The conclusions of the paper are negative with regard to the possible direct liability of such systems. A solution is proposed in the form of criminal liability for persons who create, control and monitor autonomous and non-autonomous systems.
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APA
Fenyk, J. (2026). Freedom of Will as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability: Humans and Artificial Intelligence in a Czech Criminal Law Perspective. Ius Novum, 20(1), 1-24. https://doi.org/10.2478/in-2026-0001
Vancouver
Fenyk J. Freedom of Will as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability: Humans and Artificial Intelligence in a Czech Criminal Law Perspective. Ius Novum. 2026;20(1):1-24. doi:10.2478/in-2026-0001
BibTeX
@article{Fenyk2026,
author = {Fenyk, Jaroslav},
title = {Freedom of Will as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability: Humans and Artificial Intelligence in a Czech Criminal Law Perspective},
journal = {Ius Novum},
year = {2026},
volume = {20},
number = {1},
pages = {1--24},
doi = {10.2478/in-2026-0001}
}
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