Expressivism and Alternative Normative Concepts
Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia · 20.04.2026 · 7-23
DOI: 10.24193/subbphil.2026.1.01 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia, online erschienen am 20.04.2026. Verfasst von Matti EKLUND. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In recent work – primarily the book Choosing Normative Concepts (2017) – I has presented what I see as a new, significant problem regarding normativity. Briefly, it has to do with the existence of alternative normative concepts. What if I know that I ought to φ, but at the same time I know that I ought* to ψ, where ψ is an incompatible course of action and the concept OUGHT* is an alternative OUGHT-like concept? I think that this kind of question raises many different issues. But one thing it does is to present problems for what I call ardent realism, a view which I believe often underlies what realists about normativity say and hold. Several theorists have suggested that expressivism somehow provides a way out of the problem I present, and my main aim here is to evaluate this suggestion.1 My conclusions are negative. Expressivism does not provide a way out. Or, more carefully: it does not provide a way out not already afforded by other views, and that has not already been discussed in the context of discussing such other views.
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APA
EKLUND, M. (2026). Expressivism and Alternative Normative Concepts. Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia, 7-23. https://doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2026.1.01
Vancouver
EKLUND M. Expressivism and Alternative Normative Concepts. Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia. 2026:7-23. doi:10.24193/subbphil.2026.1.01
BibTeX
@article{EKLUND2026,
author = {EKLUND, Matti},
title = {Expressivism and Alternative Normative Concepts},
journal = {Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia},
year = {2026},
pages = {7--23},
doi = {10.24193/subbphil.2026.1.01}
}
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