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Open Access · CC BY-NC 3.0

DARIUS: Incentive-driven resource management in resource-constrained networks: A contract-theoretic stackelberg game framework

Shahrzad Sedaghat, Seyedali Mirjalili

Journal of Communications and Networks · 2026-10 · 28 (5) · 598-615

DOI: 10.23919/jcn.2025.000130 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Communications and Networks, 2026-10. Verfasst von Shahrzad Sedaghat und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 3.0).

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APA

Sedaghat, S., & Mirjalili, S. (2026). DARIUS: Incentive-driven resource management in resource-constrained networks: A contract-theoretic stackelberg game framework. Journal of Communications and Networks, 28(5), 598-615. https://doi.org/10.23919/jcn.2025.000130

Vancouver

Sedaghat S, Mirjalili S. DARIUS: Incentive-driven resource management in resource-constrained networks: A contract-theoretic stackelberg game framework. Journal of Communications and Networks. 2026;28(5):598-615. doi:10.23919/jcn.2025.000130

BibTeX
@article{Sedaghat2026,
  author = {Sedaghat, Shahrzad and Mirjalili, Seyedali},
  title = {DARIUS: Incentive-driven resource management in resource-constrained networks: A contract-theoretic stackelberg game framework},
  journal = {Journal of Communications and Networks},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {28},
  number = {5},
  pages = {598--615},
  doi = {10.23919/jcn.2025.000130}
}
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