CEO Compensation, Incentive Alignment, and Carbon Transparency
Journal of International Accounting Research · 01.06.2021 · 20 (2) · 111-132
DOI: 10.2308/jiar-2020-032 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of International Accounting Research, online erschienen am 16.06.2021. Verfasst von Le Luo und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 42-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 79 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We examine whether chief executive officer compensation aligned with stakeholders' interests is associated with enhanced corporate carbon transparency. Using an international sample obtained from the CDP, we find that corporate carbon transparency—as measured by both the propensity to voluntarily disclose carbon information and the quality and comprehensiveness of the disclosure—is greater when managers' compensation contracts are better aligned with stakeholder interests. Further analyses indicate that this positive relationship is stronger in countries or regions with a code law legal system, with an inefficient rule of law, that show strong social norms toward climate change, that feature collectivist societies, and that have a long-term orientation. These findings indicate that the stakeholder agency problem of voluntary carbon disclosure can be addressed through executive incentives that are aligned with stakeholders' interests.
Zitieren
APA
Luo, L., Wu, H., & Zhang, C. (2021). CEO Compensation, Incentive Alignment, and Carbon Transparency. Journal of International Accounting Research, 20(2), 111-132. https://doi.org/10.2308/jiar-2020-032
Vancouver
Luo L, Wu H, Zhang C. CEO Compensation, Incentive Alignment, and Carbon Transparency. Journal of International Accounting Research. 2021;20(2):111-132. doi:10.2308/jiar-2020-032
BibTeX
@article{Luo2021,
author = {Luo, Le and Wu, Hongjun and Zhang, Chuyue},
title = {CEO Compensation, Incentive Alignment, and Carbon Transparency},
journal = {Journal of International Accounting Research},
year = {2021},
volume = {20},
number = {2},
pages = {111--132},
doi = {10.2308/jiar-2020-032}
}
EUVIMED