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RECENT WORK ON EPISTEMIC ENTITLEMENT

Peter J. Graham, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen

American Philosophical Quarterly · 01.04.2020 · 57 (2) · 193-214

DOI: 10.2307/48570848 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Philosophical Quarterly, erschienen am 01.04.2020. Verfasst von Peter J. Graham und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 131 Literaturangaben.

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright distinguish between justification and entitlement. For both entitlement is the new notion. For Burge, entitlement is warrant without reasons. Burge’s account of reasons is explained. For Wright, entitlement is a non-evidential right to claim knowledge of authenticity-conditions. Wright’s account is motivated by warrant transmission failure. Burge and Wright mean different things by entitlement; they do not share a common project. Burge’s use connects to mainstream epistemological inquiry into knowledge and warrant. Wright’s use connects to mainstream epistemology inquiry into skepticism and warrant transmission. Recent work from and about both is discussed. Among other results, it is shown that Burge’s distinction is not a version of the internalism vs. externalism distinction. For Burge, both justifications and entitlements are externalist.

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APA

Graham, P. J., & Pedersen, N. J. L. L. (2020). RECENT WORK ON EPISTEMIC ENTITLEMENT. American Philosophical Quarterly, 57(2), 193-214. https://doi.org/10.2307/48570848

Vancouver

Graham PJ, Pedersen NJLL. RECENT WORK ON EPISTEMIC ENTITLEMENT. American Philosophical Quarterly. 2020;57(2):193-214. doi:10.2307/48570848

BibTeX
@article{Graham2020,
  author = {Graham, Peter J. and Pedersen, Nikolaj J. L. L.},
  title = {RECENT WORK ON EPISTEMIC ENTITLEMENT},
  journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
  year = {2020},
  volume = {57},
  number = {2},
  pages = {193--214},
  doi = {10.2307/48570848}
}
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