HOW TO FORMULATE ARGUMENTS FROM EASY KNOWLEDGE, AND MAYBE HOW TO RESIST THEM
American Philosophical Quarterly · 01.10.2018 · 55 (4) · 341-355
DOI: 10.2307/45128629 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Philosophical Quarterly, erschienen am 01.10.2018. Verfasst von Alexander Jackson. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 41 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Arguments from "easy knowledge" are meant to refute a class of epistemological views, including foundationalism about perceptual knowledge. I present arguments from easy knowledge in their strongest form, and explain why other formulations in the literature are inferior. I criticize two features of Stewart Cohen’s presentation (2002, 2005), namely his focus on knowing that one’s faculties are reliable, and his use of a Williamson-style closure principle. Rather, the issue around easy knowledge must be understood using a notion of epistemic priority. Roger White’s presentation (2006) is contaminated by the so-called lottery puzzle, which is best kept separate. Distinguishing basic from non-basic visual contents limits the force of the examples discussed by Cohen, White, and Crispin Wright (2007). Finally, I present a new strategy for resisting even the best-formulated arguments from easy knowledge.
Zitieren
APA
Jackson, A. (2018). HOW TO FORMULATE ARGUMENTS FROM EASY KNOWLEDGE, AND MAYBE HOW TO RESIST THEM. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(4), 341-355. https://doi.org/10.2307/45128629
Vancouver
Jackson A. HOW TO FORMULATE ARGUMENTS FROM EASY KNOWLEDGE, AND MAYBE HOW TO RESIST THEM. American Philosophical Quarterly. 2018;55(4):341-355. doi:10.2307/45128629
BibTeX
@article{Jackson2018,
author = {Jackson, Alexander},
title = {HOW TO FORMULATE ARGUMENTS FROM EASY KNOWLEDGE, AND MAYBE HOW TO RESIST THEM},
journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
year = {2018},
volume = {55},
number = {4},
pages = {341--355},
doi = {10.2307/45128629}
}
EUVIMED