BLAME IN THE AFTERMATH OF EXCUSED WRONGDOING
Public Affairs Quarterly · 01.04.2020 · 34 (2) · 142-168
DOI: 10.2307/26921124 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Public Affairs Quarterly, erschienen am 01.04.2020. Verfasst von Adam Piovarchy. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 87 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Control accounts of moral responsibility argue that agents must possess certain capacities in order to be blameworthy for wrongdoing. This is sometimes thought to have revisionary consequences, because reflection on our moral practices reveals that we often blame many agents who lack these capacities. This paper argues that Control accounts of moral responsibility are not too revisionary, nor too permissive, because they can still demand quite a lot from excused wrongdoers. Excused wrongdoers can acquire duties of reconciliation, which require that they improve themselves, make reparations for the harm caused, and retract the meaning expressed in the original wrong. Failure to do these things expresses a lack of regard for the victims and can make those wrongdoers appropriate targets of blame.
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APA
Piovarchy, A. (2020). BLAME IN THE AFTERMATH OF EXCUSED WRONGDOING. Public Affairs Quarterly, 34(2), 142-168. https://doi.org/10.2307/26921124
Vancouver
Piovarchy A. BLAME IN THE AFTERMATH OF EXCUSED WRONGDOING. Public Affairs Quarterly. 2020;34(2):142-168. doi:10.2307/26921124
BibTeX
@article{Piovarchy2020,
author = {Piovarchy, Adam},
title = {BLAME IN THE AFTERMATH OF EXCUSED WRONGDOING},
journal = {Public Affairs Quarterly},
year = {2020},
volume = {34},
number = {2},
pages = {142--168},
doi = {10.2307/26921124}
}
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