The meaning and the scope of the separability thesis between morals and law
Theoria, Beograd · 2004
DOI: 10.2298/theo0404065s ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Theoria, Beograd, 2004. Verfasst von Sanja Stepanovic-Todorovic.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper analyzes possible meanings and implications of the separability thesis (between morals and law) mainly within the context of the Hart Dworkin debate. The separability thesis was first brought into connection with the 'soft-positivism', that was expounded on the presumption of compatibility between basic positivistic statements and moral principles i.e. values. The analysis shows that Dworkin was not in fact disputing with the separability thesis, but with the more radical version of the hard fact positivism. It is found that Hart supported one additional version of the separabiity thesis called Explicit Moral Content Thesis. According to that thesis law has no moral content or condition but the one explicitly displayed in it. That thesis is plausible if the ambiguity of epistemic and semantic sense of the rule of recognition is acceptable.
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APA
Stepanovic-Todorovic, S. (2004). The meaning and the scope of the separability thesis between morals and law. Theoria, Beograd. https://doi.org/10.2298/theo0404065s
Vancouver
Stepanovic-Todorovic S. The meaning and the scope of the separability thesis between morals and law. Theoria, Beograd. 2004. doi:10.2298/theo0404065s
BibTeX
@article{StepanovicTodorovic2004,
author = {Stepanovic-Todorovic, Sanja},
title = {The meaning and the scope of the separability thesis between morals and law},
journal = {Theoria, Beograd},
year = {2004},
doi = {10.2298/theo0404065s}
}
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