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Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

No exit!: The logic of defensive shareholder activism

Andreas Jansson

Corporate Board role duties and composition · 2014

DOI: 10.22495/cbv10i2art2 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Corporate Board role duties and composition, 2014. Verfasst von Andreas Jansson. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 59 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper examines the issue of what motivates shareholder activism. The standard explanation portrays shareholder activism as a response to poor corporate performance, but the empirical literature provides inconclusive support, indicating the need for alternative or complementary explanations. This paper contributes to the literature by showing, with the help of a case study, that shareholder activism can also be a response to increasing costs for exiting the investment, making outside shareholders increasingly exposed to expropriation risks. Significant expropriation risk can antecede a defensive type of shareholder activism characterized by intensified monitoring and reactive intervention to fend off expropriation attempts, which differs from the standard explanation in both motivation and outcome.

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APA

Jansson, A. (2014). No exit!: The logic of defensive shareholder activism. Corporate Board role duties and composition. https://doi.org/10.22495/cbv10i2art2

Vancouver

Jansson A. No exit!: The logic of defensive shareholder activism. Corporate Board role duties and composition. 2014. doi:10.22495/cbv10i2art2

BibTeX
@article{Jansson2014,
  author = {Jansson, Andreas},
  title = {No exit!: The logic of defensive shareholder activism},
  journal = {Corporate Board role duties and composition},
  year = {2014},
  doi = {10.22495/cbv10i2art2}
}
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