The role of outside statutory auditors in bank-dominated corporate governance: Evidence from Japan
Corporate Board role duties and composition · 2014
DOI: 10.22495/cbv10i1art3 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Corporate Board role duties and composition, 2014. Verfasst von Naoki Watanabel und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 32 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper examines whether or not the role of outside statutory auditors are effective post the amendment of commercial law in Japan. By this amendment, Japanese large firms are urged to appoint at least one auditor. Under bank-dominated corporate governance, the monitoring role of outside auditors do not seem to be strongly expected. The empirical question arises of whether outside auditors in Japan are effective monitors or not post the amendment of commercial law. We find managerial entrenchment effects exist for the appointment of larger outside auditors. In addition, we can find a negative relation between bank ownership and firms with more outside auditors. These findings suggest that outside auditors have not still been expected for adequate gatekeeper in Japan.
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APA
Watanabel, N., & Sakawa, H. (2014). The role of outside statutory auditors in bank-dominated corporate governance: Evidence from Japan. Corporate Board role duties and composition. https://doi.org/10.22495/cbv10i1art3
Vancouver
Watanabel N, Sakawa H. The role of outside statutory auditors in bank-dominated corporate governance: Evidence from Japan. Corporate Board role duties and composition. 2014. doi:10.22495/cbv10i1art3
BibTeX
@article{Watanabel2014,
author = {Watanabel, Naoki and Sakawa, Hideaki},
title = {The role of outside statutory auditors in bank-dominated corporate governance: Evidence from Japan},
journal = {Corporate Board role duties and composition},
year = {2014},
doi = {10.22495/cbv10i1art3}
}
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