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From Good Faith to Risk Allocation: A Self-Enforcing Joint Development in the Post-Arbitration South China Sea

Irfa Ronaboyd, Elisabeth Septin Puspoayu, Zerry Akbar Yudisetyo, Ari Firta

Uti Possidetis: Journal of International Law · 14.11.2026 · 8 (1) · 40-58

DOI: 10.22437/6k4jjn54 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Uti Possidetis: Journal of International Law, online erschienen am 14.11.2026. Verfasst von Irfa Ronaboyd und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Background

Article 74 paragraph (3) and Article 83 paragraph (3) of the 1982 UNCLOS provide a legal basis for the establishment of provisional arrangements for countries that have interests in the South China Sea. However, the overlap of maritimerights and endless jurisdictional disputes between Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam and China in the South China Sea hinder the establishment of the Joint Development Agreement. In addition, the Joint Development Agreement which is aDuty of Conduct rests on good faith that does not provide institutional arrangements and risk allocation in the process ofimplementing the Joint Development Agreement in the South China Sea area, as well as monitoring the implementation of temporaryarrangements and the imposition of sanctions for non-compliance in acting in the South China Sea area. Methodology: This studyuses normative legal research methods by utilizing legislative and conceptual approaches, as well as qualitative analysis throughdeductive reasoning.

Objectives

This study aims to analyze international legal instruments related to joint development amongcoastal countries in dispute in the South China Sea region based on UNCLOS 1982 and the implications of the 2016 ArbitrationAward, as well as to formulate a risk-based legal framework that is able to accommodate potential state non-compliance throughself-enforcement mechanisms.

Findings

The 2016 Arbitration Award rejected historical rights and clarified territories whosemaritime rights overlap, but China's non-compliance exposed the law enforcement gap in the South China Sea. The study proposes a Risk-Based Joint Development (RBJD) framework that includes strengthening no-prejudice clauses, layered governance, investmentrisk allocation, layered dispute resolution outside UNCLOS, environmental protection, and a phased compliance mechanism. Originality/Novelty: This research offers a risk-based legal framework that places potential non-compliance as a structural variablein the clauses of joint development agreements through self-enforcement mechanisms, thereby contributing to the development of international law of the sea consistent with UNCLOS 1982 and the 2016 Arbitration Awards.

Zitieren

APA

Ronaboyd, I., Puspoayu, E. S., Yudisetyo, Z. A., & Firta, A. (2026). From Good Faith to Risk Allocation: A Self-Enforcing Joint Development in the Post-Arbitration South China Sea. Uti Possidetis: Journal of International Law, 8(1), 40-58. https://doi.org/10.22437/6k4jjn54

Vancouver

Ronaboyd I, Puspoayu ES, Yudisetyo ZA, Firta A. From Good Faith to Risk Allocation: A Self-Enforcing Joint Development in the Post-Arbitration South China Sea. Uti Possidetis: Journal of International Law. 2026;8(1):40-58. doi:10.22437/6k4jjn54

BibTeX
@article{Ronaboyd2026,
  author = {Ronaboyd, Irfa and Puspoayu, Elisabeth Septin and Yudisetyo, Zerry Akbar and Firta, Ari},
  title = {From Good Faith to Risk Allocation: A Self-Enforcing Joint Development in the Post-Arbitration South China Sea},
  journal = {Uti Possidetis: Journal of International Law},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {8},
  number = {1},
  pages = {40--58},
  doi = {10.22437/6k4jjn54}
}
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