Corporate Tax Avoidance from the Perspective of Agency Theory and Multi-Task Incentives
Journal of Business Theory and Practice · 16.08.2026 · 14 (1) · p110
DOI: 10.22158/jbtp.v14n1p110 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Business Theory and Practice, online erschienen am 16.08.2026. Verfasst von Yu Xianting. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Tax avoidance reflects more than a firm’s reaction to tax rules. It is a choice made by managers who weigh competing pressures while their own interests often stray from those of shareholders. This article starts from two premises. First, when ownership is separate from control, the complexity of tax planning lets managers hide rent extraction behind apparent tax reduction. Second, tax decisions occur in a multi-dimensional setting. Managers divide effort across profitability, compliance, ESG metrics, and political costs. A stronger push on one dimension predictably alters behavior on others. The article traces the agency-cost logic of tax avoidance, the trade-offs that surface when multiple tasks compete for managerial attention, and the ways institutional conditions shape both.
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APA
Xianting, Y. (2026). Corporate Tax Avoidance from the Perspective of Agency Theory and Multi-Task Incentives. Journal of Business Theory and Practice, 14(1), p110. https://doi.org/10.22158/jbtp.v14n1p110
Vancouver
Xianting Y. Corporate Tax Avoidance from the Perspective of Agency Theory and Multi-Task Incentives. Journal of Business Theory and Practice. 2026;14(1):p110. doi:10.22158/jbtp.v14n1p110
BibTeX
@article{Xianting2026,
author = {Xianting, Yu},
title = {Corporate Tax Avoidance from the Perspective of Agency Theory and Multi-Task Incentives},
journal = {Journal of Business Theory and Practice},
year = {2026},
volume = {14},
number = {1},
pages = {p110},
doi = {10.22158/jbtp.v14n1p110}
}
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