Cross-Cultural Trade and Institutional Stability
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics · 16.10.2009 · 9 (1)
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1565 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, online erschienen am 16.10.2009. Verfasst von Marianna Belloc. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 28 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Traditional trade theory maintains that international economic integration always yields potential welfare benefits. This result can however be maintained only in a world bereft of its institutional and cultural dimensions. In this paper we show that, once institutional factors are introduced, integration may be detrimental to welfare. Exploiting a game theoretical approach, we consider the integration between two societies that only differ in their institutional structures. Two important results are derived. First, intercommunity integration may trigger the demise of the erstwhile internal arrangements. Second, the collapse of the domestic institutional equilibrium can lead to a loss of welfare for the community as a whole.
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APA
Belloc, M. (2009). Cross-Cultural Trade and Institutional Stability. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 9(1). https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1565
Vancouver
Belloc M. Cross-Cultural Trade and Institutional Stability. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2009;9(1). doi:10.2202/1935-1704.1565
BibTeX
@article{Belloc2009,
author = {Belloc, Marianna},
title = {Cross-Cultural Trade and Institutional Stability},
journal = {The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics},
year = {2009},
volume = {9},
number = {1},
doi = {10.2202/1935-1704.1565}
}
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