Vers une nouvelle reforme de l'organisation commune de marche de la banane
AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA) · 01.01.2025
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.354647 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA), erschienen am 01.01.2025. Verfasst von Catherine Laroche-Dupraz.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Sharecropping is usually explained by a trade-off between tenant's risk aversion and incentives (standard Principal-Agent approach) or between agency costs under various market imperfections, and with risk-neutral agents (transaction costs approach). This Mexican case-study illustrates a situation where contractual rationales refute the standard Principal-Agent model and where share- cropping can be analyzed as a resource pooling device, but without any major role given to moral hazard in contractual choice. In this situation, sharecropping features a partnership rather than agency relationships.
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APA
Laroche-Dupraz, C. (2025). Vers une nouvelle reforme de l'organisation commune de marche de la banane. AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA). https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.354647
Vancouver
Laroche-Dupraz C. Vers une nouvelle reforme de l'organisation commune de marche de la banane. AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA). 2025. doi:10.22004/ag.econ.354647
BibTeX
@article{LarocheDupraz2025,
author = {Laroche-Dupraz, Catherine},
title = {Vers une nouvelle reforme de l'organisation commune de marche de la banane},
journal = {AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA)},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.22004/ag.econ.354647}
}
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