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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Research on water rights trading based on dynamic differential game: a case study of the Yellow River basin

Jinhua Liu, Pei Pan, Jinsuo Zhang, Haoyu Zhou, Shan He

Water Policy · 30.10.2026

DOI: 10.2166/wp.2026.119 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Water Policy, online erschienen am 30.10.2026. Verfasst von Jinhua Liu und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 35 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Foundation, Ministry of Education.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

A two-layer game model optimizes water rights trading in the Yellow River Basin. Minimizing sewage parameters (h, I) boosts efficiency and equity. Price, driven by terminal value (k) and discount rate (r), peaks stability at a saddle point. Excessively long trading cycles cause price decay and imbalance. Rapid industrialization and urbanization are sharply increasing water demand, so efficient management, equitable allocation, and sustainable use are imperative. Amid intensifying basin-scale supply–demand imbalances, water-rights trading is a key instrument for reallocation. Guided by game theory, we construct a two-tier dynamic differential-game model of water rights allocation and pricing, validate its robustness through dynamic simulation, and apply it empirically to the Yellow River Basin. Results show that: (1) Regional optimal allocation is governed by sewage discharge proportion and unit sewage output value proportion. When both shares approach their minima, basin-wide supply efficiency peaks, the regional Gini coefficient declines, and equity improves. (2) The equilibrium trading price is positively correlated with the water's terminal value and negatively correlated with the discount rate; their interaction yields an asymmetric response surface whose saddle point maximizes price stability. (3) Trading-cycle length is positively correlated with traded volume, yet excessively long cycles trigger price decay and spatial divergence: deficits accelerate in ecologically fragile areas while surplus regions enjoy rising rents, aggravating basin-wide imbalance. The findings provide dynamic decision support for basin water rights trading and promote balanced progress between ecological conservation and high-quality economic growth.

Förderung

  • Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Foundation, Ministry of Education

Zitieren

APA

Liu, J., Pan, P., Zhang, J., Zhou, H., & He, S. (2026). Research on water rights trading based on dynamic differential game: a case study of the Yellow River basin. Water Policy. https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2026.119

Vancouver

Liu J, Pan P, Zhang J, Zhou H, He S. Research on water rights trading based on dynamic differential game: a case study of the Yellow River basin. Water Policy. 2026. doi:10.2166/wp.2026.119

BibTeX
@article{Liu2026,
  author = {Liu, Jinhua and Pan, Pei and Zhang, Jinsuo and Zhou, Haoyu and He, Shan},
  title = {Research on water rights trading based on dynamic differential game: a case study of the Yellow River basin},
  journal = {Water Policy},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.2166/wp.2026.119}
}
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