A Threat-Informed Framework for Secure Customer Identity (CIAM) Migration in Financial Services: Applying STRIDE, PASTA and Attack Trees to Legacy-to-Passwordless Transitions
International Journal of Humanities and Information Technology · 14.08.2026 · 8 (03) · 72-82
DOI: 10.21590/ijhit.08.03.09 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of Humanities and Information Technology, online erschienen am 14.08.2026. Verfasst von Olabode Michael Soneye und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Financial institutions are replacing legacy customer authentication (passwords, one-time passcodes and hardware tokens) with phishing-resistant, passwordless Customer Identity and Access Management (CIAM) built on FIDO2 passkeys, OpenID Connect and sender-constrained OAuth 2.0 tokens. Research and standards describe the security of the target state well, but say little about the migration itself. During migration, legacy and modern identity stacks run side by side, customers hold mixed authenticators, and recovery, enrollment and federation paths multiply. This paper argues that the coexistence period is a distinct threat surface and that no single threat-modeling method covers it adequately.Using a design-science approach, the paper makes four contributions. First, it derives a catalogue of sixteen migration-specific threats (MT-01 to MT-16), including authenticator downgrade, enrollment hijacking, recovery bypass, issuer mix-up and orphaned legacy endpoints. Second, it proposes the Phased Threat-Informed Migration Framework (PTIMF), which uses PASTA as the governing risk process, STRIDE for element-level analysis of phase-specific data flow diagrams, and attack trees for multi-step account-takeover goals. Third, it maps each threat to controls drawn from NIST SP 800-63-4, NIST SP 800-207 and the IETF OAuth security standards (PKCE, DPoP and RFC 9700). Fourth, an analytic coverage evaluation and an illustrative composite banking scenario show that the three methods are complementary: STRIDE surfaces most technical element threats, while process threats such as recovery abuse, policy drift and migration-themed phishing emerge mainly through PASTA and attack-tree analysis. The paper closes with phase-gate criteria for practitioners and a research agenda for empirical validation.
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APA
Soneye, O. M., & Ayeyemi, B. M. (2026). A Threat-Informed Framework for Secure Customer Identity (CIAM) Migration in Financial Services: Applying STRIDE, PASTA and Attack Trees to Legacy-to-Passwordless Transitions. International Journal of Humanities and Information Technology, 8(03), 72-82. https://doi.org/10.21590/ijhit.08.03.09
Vancouver
Soneye OM, Ayeyemi BM. A Threat-Informed Framework for Secure Customer Identity (CIAM) Migration in Financial Services: Applying STRIDE, PASTA and Attack Trees to Legacy-to-Passwordless Transitions. International Journal of Humanities and Information Technology. 2026;8(03):72-82. doi:10.21590/ijhit.08.03.09
BibTeX
@article{Soneye2026,
author = {Soneye, Olabode Michael and Ayeyemi, Bolaji Mubarak},
title = {A Threat-Informed Framework for Secure Customer Identity (CIAM) Migration in Financial Services: Applying STRIDE, PASTA and Attack Trees to Legacy-to-Passwordless Transitions},
journal = {International Journal of Humanities and Information Technology},
year = {2026},
volume = {8},
number = {03},
pages = {72--82},
doi = {10.21590/ijhit.08.03.09}
}
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