Disfunción, desajuste y subdeterminación empírica
Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía · 14.06.2026 · (76) · 219-253
DOI: 10.21555/top.v760.3359 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, online erschienen am 14.06.2026. Verfasst von Federico Burdman und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Are psychiatric disorders caused by a malfunction in the mind’s mechanisms? Or can they be explained as the result of a mismatch between our psychological mechanisms and an environment different from the one in which these systems evolved? In this paper, we draw on central elements of Daniel Dennett’s conception of proper function to address a specific version of the debate between theories of dysfunction and theories of mismatch, focusing on cases of substance addiction. Following Dennett’s idea that there is no decisive fact determining the proper function of biological systems, we argue that the decision regarding the dysfunction of the reward system in addiction is underdetermined by the evidence. Our argument calls for a reorientation of the discussion, suggesting a new focus on the pragmatic considerations that can be invoked to choose between two empirically equivalent theories.
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APA
Burdman, F., Loaiza, J. R., & Pereira, F. (2026). Disfunción, desajuste y subdeterminación empírica. Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, 219-253. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v760.3359
Vancouver
Burdman F, Loaiza JR, Pereira F. Disfunción, desajuste y subdeterminación empírica. Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía. 2026:219-253. doi:10.21555/top.v760.3359
BibTeX
@article{Burdman2026,
author = {Burdman, Federico and Loaiza, Juan R. and Pereira, Francisco},
title = {Disfunción, desajuste y subdeterminación empírica},
journal = {Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía},
year = {2026},
number = {76},
pages = {219--253},
doi = {10.21555/top.v760.3359}
}
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