Macroprudential Policy, Balance Sheets, and Tail Risk
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2026
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.6397098 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift SSRN Electronic Journal, 2026. Verfasst von Yucheng Zhou.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper develops a continuous-time general equilibrium model in which risk-tolerant financial intermediaries borrow from risk-averse households to hold levered positions in productive capital, subject to Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraints on their risk exposure. Adverse aggregate shocks erode intermediary capital and depress asset prices and investment through a balance sheet channel-precisely the conditions under which VaR constraints bind, triggering forced deleveraging that amplifies these effects. The quantitative analysis reveals a central tension in macroprudential regulation: tighter constraints mitigate tail risk, but simultaneously increase the overall volatility of the financial system by magnifying the impact of shocks when constraints bind. The crisis analysis sharpens this tension: tighter constraints reduce crisis frequency but prolong crisis duration, while a state-dependent constraint that tightens with financial conditions comes closest to matching NBER-dated recession statistics.
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APA
Zhou, Y. (2026). Macroprudential Policy, Balance Sheets, and Tail Risk. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6397098
Vancouver
Zhou Y. Macroprudential Policy, Balance Sheets, and Tail Risk. SSRN Electronic Journal. 2026. doi:10.2139/ssrn.6397098
BibTeX
@article{Zhou2026,
author = {Zhou, Yucheng},
title = {Macroprudential Policy, Balance Sheets, and Tail Risk},
journal = {SSRN Electronic Journal},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.2139/ssrn.6397098}
}
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