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Optimal incentive contracts with job destruction risk

Borys Grochulski, Russell Wong, Yuzhe Zhang

Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Papers · 2017

DOI: 10.21144/wp17-11 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Papers, 2017. Verfasst von Borys Grochulski und 2 weiteren Autor:innen.

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APA

Grochulski, B., Wong, R., & Zhang, Y. (2017). Optimal incentive contracts with job destruction risk. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Papers. https://doi.org/10.21144/wp17-11

Vancouver

Grochulski B, Wong R, Zhang Y. Optimal incentive contracts with job destruction risk. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Papers. 2017. doi:10.21144/wp17-11

BibTeX
@article{Grochulski2017,
  author = {Grochulski, Borys and Wong, Russell and Zhang, Yuzhe},
  title = {Optimal incentive contracts with job destruction risk},
  journal = {Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Papers},
  year = {2017},
  doi = {10.21144/wp17-11}
}
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