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MISTAKEN AND ACCIDENTAL WARS: RATIONALITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND STRATEGIC CHOICE IN THE ONSET OF ARMED CONFLICT

Mykola Kapitonenko

Actual Problems of International Relations · 2026 · (166) · 40-48

DOI: 10.17721/apmv.2026.166.1.40-48 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Actual Problems of International Relations, 2026. Verfasst von Mykola Kapitonenko. Die Arbeit nennt 24 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Wars are frequently characterized as accidents, mistakes, or unintended consequences of miscalculation. Such interpretations are deeply embedded in both popular discourse and classical reflections on war, where armed conflict is often portrayed as a breakdown of diplomacy or rational control. At the same time, much of contemporary international relations theory rests on the assumption that states and their leaders are broadly rational actors who seek to maximize expected utility under constraints. This creates a persistent puzzle: if war is costly, risky, and widely recognized as destructive, why do rational decision-makers repeatedly choose it? This article argues that the opposition between “accidental” and “deliberate” war is analytically misleading. Rather than being the product of sheer error or irrationality, most wars emerge from strategic interaction under conditions of uncertainty, incomplete information, and political constraint. What are often described ex post as “mistaken” wars are more accurately understood as high-risk strategies whose unfavourable outcomes materialized de-facto. Conversely, wars that achieve immediate objectives may still constitute strategic errors if decision-makers systematically underestimated costs or overestimated benefits. The article develops this argument by integrating rationalist bargaining theory with insights from political psychology, escalation theory, and domestic politics. It conceptualizes war as a gamble under uncertainty, where probabilities are endogenous and shaped by interaction with adaptive adversaries. It further distinguishes between mistaken wars and accidental wars, emphasizing escalation dynamics, brinkmanship, and loss of control. Finally, it examines how cognitive biases, group decision-making processes, and domestic political incentives condition leaders’ willingness to accept risk. Taken together, the analysis challenges outcome-based judgments of war and offers a more nuanced framework for understanding why wars occur despite their recognized costs.

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APA

Kapitonenko, M. (2026). MISTAKEN AND ACCIDENTAL WARS: RATIONALITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND STRATEGIC CHOICE IN THE ONSET OF ARMED CONFLICT. Actual Problems of International Relations, 40-48. https://doi.org/10.17721/apmv.2026.166.1.40-48

Vancouver

Kapitonenko M. MISTAKEN AND ACCIDENTAL WARS: RATIONALITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND STRATEGIC CHOICE IN THE ONSET OF ARMED CONFLICT. Actual Problems of International Relations. 2026:40-48. doi:10.17721/apmv.2026.166.1.40-48

BibTeX
@article{Kapitonenko2026,
  author = {Kapitonenko, Mykola},
  title = {MISTAKEN AND ACCIDENTAL WARS: RATIONALITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND STRATEGIC CHOICE IN THE ONSET OF ARMED CONFLICT},
  journal = {Actual Problems of International Relations},
  year = {2026},
  number = {166},
  pages = {40--48},
  doi = {10.17721/apmv.2026.166.1.40-48}
}
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