HYBRID CLASSICAL-POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR BLOCKCHAIN: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE GAP BETWEEN PROPOSED CONSTRUCTIONS AND THEIR FORMAL SECURITY PROOFS
Advances in Computer Science and Engineering · 2026 · 20 (2) · 87-108
DOI: 10.17654/0973699926005 ↗Kurz gefasst
Systematische Übersicht in der Zeitschrift Advances in Computer Science and Engineering, 2026. Verfasst von Shaina Mahajan und 2 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Blockchain systems authorize transactions with elliptic-curve signatures whose security collapses under Shor's algorithm, and their ledgers are permanent and public, so a future quantum adversary can act on signatures published today. Hybrid constructions, which combine a classical primitive with a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) primitive so that security survives the failure of either, have become the consensus transition strategy across standards bodies and blockchain roadmaps. This review asks a narrower question than existing surveys: for the hybrid constructions actually proposed and deployed, what has in fact been proven, and in which model? Following a PRISMA-style protocol over six databases and three standards sources, we screened 371 de-duplicated records and synthesized 50. We find a systematic asymmetry. Hybrid key-encapsulation combiners rest on a mature theory with explicit robustness proofs, and the standalone NIST primitives now have quantum-random-oracle-model (QROM) and in some cases machine-checked proofs. Hybrid signature combiners do not: standard EU-CMA is insufficient for them because it does not exclude separability and cross-protocol recombination attacks, the stronger notions that do are recent and cover few constructions, and only one hybrid signature scheme has a machine-checked EUF-CMA proof. > Blockchain-facing proposals sit at the far end of this gap, typically presenting a construction with no stated security notion. We contribute a proof-coverage audit matrix over ten representative constructions, classified against explicit, source-checkable criteria; correct several recurring claims, including the standardization status of FN-DSA and the role of quantum collision-finding in SLH-DSA parameter selection; and identify the proof obligations a blockchain-deployable hybrid signature must discharge, including a security model for the permanent public disclosure of signatures.
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APA
Mahajan, S., Sadotra, P., & Thakur, K. (2026). HYBRID CLASSICAL-POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR BLOCKCHAIN: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE GAP BETWEEN PROPOSED CONSTRUCTIONS AND THEIR FORMAL SECURITY PROOFS. Advances in Computer Science and Engineering, 20(2), 87-108. https://doi.org/10.17654/0973699926005
Vancouver
Mahajan S, Sadotra P, Thakur K. HYBRID CLASSICAL-POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR BLOCKCHAIN: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE GAP BETWEEN PROPOSED CONSTRUCTIONS AND THEIR FORMAL SECURITY PROOFS. Advances in Computer Science and Engineering. 2026;20(2):87-108. doi:10.17654/0973699926005
BibTeX
@article{Mahajan2026,
author = {Mahajan, Shaina and Sadotra, Parveen and Thakur, Kailash},
title = {HYBRID CLASSICAL-POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR BLOCKCHAIN: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE GAP BETWEEN PROPOSED CONSTRUCTIONS AND THEIR FORMAL SECURITY PROOFS},
journal = {Advances in Computer Science and Engineering},
year = {2026},
volume = {20},
number = {2},
pages = {87--108},
doi = {10.17654/0973699926005}
}
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