The Control–Ownership Wedge and Corporate Social Responsibility
GLOBAL BUSINESS FINANCE REVIEW · 30.12.2017 · 22 (4) · 15-29
DOI: 10.17549/gbfr.2017.22.4.15 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift GLOBAL BUSINESS FINANCE REVIEW, online erschienen am 30.12.2017. Verfasst von Hae-Young Ryu und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We examine the effect of the control–ownership wedge (the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights) in Korean business groups (Chaebols) on corporate social responsibility activities. The results of our analyses show that on corporate social responsibility activities decrease as the control–ownership wedge increases. This result remains consistent when on corporate social responsibility scores are used. This study provides evidence that a greater control–ownership wedge decreases engagement in corporate social responsibility activities in the context of Korean business groups (Chaebols), with their unique ownership structure.
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APA
Ryu, H., Chae, S., & Cho, M. (2017). The Control–Ownership Wedge and Corporate Social Responsibility. GLOBAL BUSINESS FINANCE REVIEW, 22(4), 15-29. https://doi.org/10.17549/gbfr.2017.22.4.15
Vancouver
Ryu H, Chae S, Cho M. The Control–Ownership Wedge and Corporate Social Responsibility. GLOBAL BUSINESS FINANCE REVIEW. 2017;22(4):15-29. doi:10.17549/gbfr.2017.22.4.15
BibTeX
@article{Ryu2017,
author = {Ryu, Hae-Young and Chae, Soo-Joon and Cho, Moon-Kyung},
title = {The Control–Ownership Wedge and Corporate Social Responsibility},
journal = {GLOBAL BUSINESS FINANCE REVIEW},
year = {2017},
volume = {22},
number = {4},
pages = {15--29},
doi = {10.17549/gbfr.2017.22.4.15}
}
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