Are Emotions Valueceptions or Responses to Values? Husserl’s Phenomenology of Affectivity Reconsidered
Phenomenology and Mind · 2022 · (23) · 54-65
DOI: 10.17454/pam-2303 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Phenomenology and Mind, 2022. Verfasst von Alexis Delamare. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 13-mal zitiert (Crossref). Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
How are we able to experience values? Two sides are competing in contemporary literature: ‘Meinongians’ (represented notably by Christine Tappolet) claim that axiological properties are apprehended in emotions, while ‘Hildebrandians’ (represented in particular by Ingrid Vendrell Ferran) assert that such experiences of value (or valueceptions) are accomplished in special ‘value feelings’, and that emotions are only responses to these felt values. In this paper, I study the Husserlian viewpoint on this issue. I reveal that, contrary to what almost all scholars have assumed so far, Husserl’s position is not reducible to Meinong’s and must on the contrary be regarded as an innovative and stimulating approach that helps unifying the two standard frameworks. It indeed recognizes (with Hildebrandians) the existence of non-emotional value feelings, while maintaining (with Meinongians) that originary axiological experiences are necessarily emotional.
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APA
Delamare, A. (2022). Are Emotions Valueceptions or Responses to Values? Husserl’s Phenomenology of Affectivity Reconsidered. Phenomenology and Mind, 54-65. https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2303
Vancouver
Delamare A. Are Emotions Valueceptions or Responses to Values? Husserl’s Phenomenology of Affectivity Reconsidered. Phenomenology and Mind. 2022:54-65. doi:10.17454/pam-2303
BibTeX
@article{Delamare2022,
author = {Delamare, Alexis},
title = {Are Emotions Valueceptions or Responses to Values? Husserl’s Phenomenology of Affectivity Reconsidered},
journal = {Phenomenology and Mind},
year = {2022},
number = {23},
pages = {54--65},
doi = {10.17454/pam-2303}
}
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