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Dynamic game analysis of opinion dynamics based on comparison with average opinions in a social network with stubborn agents

Яншань Лю, Yanshan Liu, Владимир Викторович Мазалов, Vladimir V. Mazalov, Пин Сунь, Ping Sun, Ядзин Чен, Yajin Chen

Mathematical Game Theory and Applications · 23.10.2026 · 18 (2) · 77-109

DOI: 10.17076/mgta_2026_2_101 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, online erschienen am 23.10.2026. Verfasst von Яншань Лю und 7 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In opinion dynamics, consensus formation is a dynamic and iterative process in which external players influence agents’ opinions through feedback-based decision mechanisms. In this paper, we study a dynamic game model of opinion evolution in a social network with average-based interactions, where a subset of agents exhibits stubborn behavior characterized by heterogeneous stubbornness parameters, while being influenced by external players. The players aim to steer the opinions of all agents toward a common desired value.The proposed model is formulated as a discrete-time linear–quadratic dynamic game. Using the Bellman equation, we derive the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies and the corresponding optimal opinion trajectories. Theoretical analysis characterizes the convergence behavior and identifies conditions under which opinion consensus is achieved.Numerical simulations illustrate how average-based interactions and the locations of stubborn agents affect consensus formation under different control strategies. In addition, the impact of unknown agent stubbornness on the players’ payoffs is investigated. The results provide insights into the interplay between network structure, agent stubbornness, and strategic control in guiding opinion consensus.

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APA

Лю, Я., Liu, Y., Мазалов, В. В., Mazalov, V. V., Сунь, П., Sun, P., Чен, Я., & Chen, Y. (2026). Dynamic game analysis of opinion dynamics based on comparison with average opinions in a social network with stubborn agents. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 18(2), 77-109. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2026_2_101

Vancouver

Лю Я, Liu Y, Мазалов ВВ, Mazalov VV, Сунь П, Sun P, et al. Dynamic game analysis of opinion dynamics based on comparison with average opinions in a social network with stubborn agents. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications. 2026;18(2):77-109. doi:10.17076/mgta_2026_2_101

BibTeX
@article{2026,
  author = {Лю, Яншань and Liu, Yanshan and Мазалов, Владимир Викторович and Mazalov, Vladimir V. and Сунь, Пин and Sun, Ping and Чен, Ядзин and Chen, Yajin},
  title = {Dynamic game analysis of opinion dynamics based on comparison with average opinions in a social network with stubborn agents},
  journal = {Mathematical Game Theory and Applications},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {18},
  number = {2},
  pages = {77--109},
  doi = {10.17076/mgta_2026_2_101}
}
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