Corruption mechanisms in models of social and private interests combining engine in the case of one agent. Optimization approach
Mathematical Game Theory and Applications · 2020
DOI: 10.17076/mgta_2020_2_15 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 2020. Verfasst von Ольга Ивановна Горбанева und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The paper is devoted to the investigation of corruption in models of social and private interests combining (SPICE-models) in the case of one agent. The specific attention in the article is given to the optimization approach investigation. In the structure of model between the higher level (principal) and the lower levels (agents) element "supervisor" is included. Supervisor acts in interests of principal, but he can weaken principal's demands for agent in exchange of a bribe. Administrative and economic corruption mechanisms are introduced and investigated. Optimization approach is applied.
Zitieren
APA
Горбанева, О. И., & Gorbaneva, O. (2020). Corruption mechanisms in models of social and private interests combining engine in the case of one agent. Optimization approach. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2020_2_15
Vancouver
Горбанева ОИ, Gorbaneva O. Corruption mechanisms in models of social and private interests combining engine in the case of one agent. Optimization approach. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications. 2020. doi:10.17076/mgta_2020_2_15
BibTeX
@article{2020,
author = {Горбанева, Ольга Ивановна and Gorbaneva, Olga},
title = {Corruption mechanisms in models of social and private interests combining engine in the case of one agent. Optimization approach},
journal = {Mathematical Game Theory and Applications},
year = {2020},
doi = {10.17076/mgta_2020_2_15}
}
EUVIMED