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Corruption mechanisms in models of social and private interests combining engine in the case of one agent. Optimization approach

Ольга Ивановна Горбанева, Olga Gorbaneva

Mathematical Game Theory and Applications · 2020

DOI: 10.17076/mgta_2020_2_15 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 2020. Verfasst von Ольга Ивановна Горбанева und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The paper is devoted to the investigation of corruption in models of social and private interests combining (SPICE-models) in the case of one agent. The specific attention in the article is given to the optimization approach investigation. In the structure of model between the higher level (principal) and the lower levels (agents) element "supervisor" is included. Supervisor acts in interests of principal, but he can weaken principal's demands for agent in exchange of a bribe. Administrative and economic corruption mechanisms are introduced and investigated. Optimization approach is applied.

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APA

Горбанева, О. И., & Gorbaneva, O. (2020). Corruption mechanisms in models of social and private interests combining engine in the case of one agent. Optimization approach. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2020_2_15

Vancouver

Горбанева ОИ, Gorbaneva O. Corruption mechanisms in models of social and private interests combining engine in the case of one agent. Optimization approach. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications. 2020. doi:10.17076/mgta_2020_2_15

BibTeX
@article{2020,
  author = {Горбанева, Ольга Ивановна and Gorbaneva, Olga},
  title = {Corruption mechanisms in models of social and private interests combining engine in the case of one agent. Optimization approach},
  journal = {Mathematical Game Theory and Applications},
  year = {2020},
  doi = {10.17076/mgta_2020_2_15}
}
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