Pricing of Platforms in Two-Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Agents and Limited Market Size
Mathematical Game Theory and Applications · 2019
DOI: 10.17076/mgta1_5 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 2019. Verfasst von Zhenhua Feng und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study a two-sided market represented by network platforms and heterogeneous agents. Our setup departs from Armstrong (2006)’s monopoly model by assuming both (1) a continuum of agents of limited size on each side of the market and (2) heterogeneous utility of agents with Hotelling specification. We show that the monopoly’s optimal pricing strategy always results in a corner solution in terms of the equilibrium market share. We also solve for the social planner’s optimization problem and obtain a similar corner solution result. In addition, the exact values for the equilibrium in the case of duopoly for a two-sided market on two platforms are obtained.
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APA
Feng, Z., Лиу, Т., Мазалов, В., Mazalov, V., & Zheng, J. (2019). Pricing of Platforms in Two-Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Agents and Limited Market Size. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta1_5
Vancouver
Feng Z, Лиу Т, Мазалов В, Mazalov V, Zheng J. Pricing of Platforms in Two-Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Agents and Limited Market Size. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications. 2019. doi:10.17076/mgta1_5
BibTeX
@article{Feng2019,
author = {Feng, Zhenhua and Лиу, Таосин and Мазалов, Владимир and Mazalov, Vladimir and Zheng, Jie},
title = {Pricing of Platforms in Two-Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Agents and Limited Market Size},
journal = {Mathematical Game Theory and Applications},
year = {2019},
doi = {10.17076/mgta1_5}
}
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