Political Competition, Casual Relationships Between Taxes and Spending, and Their Influence on Government Size: Evidence From State-Level Data
International Finance Discussion Papers · 1995-02 · 1995.0 (500) · 1-25
DOI: 10.17016/ifdp.1995.500 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Finance Discussion Papers, 1995-02. Verfasst von Diane Lim Rogers und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Theories of fiscal illusion and political competition have different implications for (i) the causal relationships between taxes and spending, and (ii) government size. These are tested using data from u.s. states from 1950 to 1990. We find evidence that greater political competition generally encourages bigger government, the Democratic Party is associated with bigger government, and state governments which "tax first, spend later" are more likely to be large. Other factors related to the fiscal illusion and political competition theories also appear to be important determinants of government size.
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APA
Rogers, D. L., & Rogers, J. H. (1995). Political Competition, Casual Relationships Between Taxes and Spending, and Their Influence on Government Size: Evidence From State-Level Data. International Finance Discussion Papers, 1995.0(500), 1-25. https://doi.org/10.17016/ifdp.1995.500
Vancouver
Rogers DL, Rogers JH. Political Competition, Casual Relationships Between Taxes and Spending, and Their Influence on Government Size: Evidence From State-Level Data. International Finance Discussion Papers. 1995;1995.0(500):1-25. doi:10.17016/ifdp.1995.500
BibTeX
@article{Rogers1995,
author = {Rogers, Diane Lim and Rogers, John Harold},
title = {Political Competition, Casual Relationships Between Taxes and Spending, and Their Influence on Government Size: Evidence From State-Level Data},
journal = {International Finance Discussion Papers},
year = {1995},
volume = {1995.0},
number = {500},
pages = {1--25},
doi = {10.17016/ifdp.1995.500}
}
EUVIMED